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Abstract. With increasing use of information systems, many organi-
zations are outsourcing information security protection to a managed
security service provider (MSSP). However, diagnosing the risk of an in-
formation system requires special expertise, which could be costly and
difficult to acquire. The MSSP may exploit their professional advantage
and provide fraudulent diagnosis of clients’ vulnerabilities. Such an in-
centive to mis-represent clients’ risks is often called the credence goods
problem in the economics literature[3]. Although different mechanisms
have been introduced to tackle the credence goods problem, in the in-
formation security outsourcing context, such mechanisms may not work
well with the presence of system interdependency risks[6], which are in-
troduced by inter-connecting multiple clients’ systems by the MSSP. In
particular, we find that allowing clients to seek alternative diagnosis of
their vulnerabilities may not remove the MSSP’s fraudulent behaviors.
We shall explore alternative ways to solve the credence goods problem
in the information security outsourcing context.
Keywords: Information security outsourcing, credence good, interde-
pendency risks
1 Introduction
Enhancing the security of information systems has become an important task for
organizations. An accurate risk assessment is often important in implementing
a cost-efficient security protection. By knowing the actual risk level, an organi-
zation can procure the appropriate level of security protection.3 However, it is
not easy to accurately diagnose the risk of an information system, especially for
organizations without proper security expertise. Therefore, many organizations
would prefer to outsource their security protection to a managed security service
provider (MSSP). Yet, the information asymmetry between the MSSP and his
clients introduces an incentive for the MSSP to cheat his clients, which could
3 An excessively high security protection could lead to wastage of resources and poor
usability. Similarly, sub-standard security protection could expose the organization
to excessive risks and losses.
2 Ke, Hui and Yue
subsequently lead to fraudulent behaviors.[4][5]4 In this study, we investigate
such an incentive and discuss the implications for practices of security protec-
tion. We also study the challenges brought by system interdependency, which is
a key feature of information security outsourcing that introduces new risks to
the clients.[2][6]
Our model is founded on contract theory in economics, which studies how
the MSSP and his clients behave based on their incentives.[1] While the prior
literature in credence goods studies mechanisms to prevent inefficient treat-
ment [3][4][5], our study focuses on fraudulent diagnosis and how clients can
obtain their true risk level from the MSSP’s diagnosis. In particular, we shall
discuss how the MSSP decides his pricing mechanism and how it variously relates
to his incentive to provide honest/dishonest diagnosis.
Section 2 presents our basic model. We start by showing that the MSSP will
always charge one price to all clients of different risks, and hence his diagnosis
is un-informative. Then, we introduce the self-diagnosis option to the clients
and show that it incentivizes the MSSP to provide truthful diagnosis. Section 3
discusses the impact of introducing system interdependency risk. In particular,
we show that in the presence of system interdependency risks self-diagnosis is
insufficient to rectify the MSSP’s incentive to hide the clients’ risks.
2 Basic Model
We make the following assumptions in the basic model: [A1] There are n clients
and one managed security service provider (MSSP). Each client values her system
at v. [A2] Each client’s system face a particular risk ω ∈ {h, l} decided by the
nature. The probability of being high risk is r, and the probability of being
low risk is 1 − r. [A3] A high risk system will be attacked by a hacker with
probability ah ∈ (0, 1). A low risk system will be attacked with probability
al ∈ (0, 1), ah > al. [A4] The clients do not know their risk levels. The MSSP can
accurately diagnose clients’ risk levels. [A5] The unit cost of security protection
quality q, which represents the probability of deterring an attack, is ck for clients
and cs for MSSP, ck > cs. [A6] v, r, ah, al, ck, cs are public information. [A7]
ahv < cs. [A8] The clients cannot verify the MSSP’s effort in security protection
(i.e., there is no verifiability).
Assumption A7 implies complete security protection is cost-inefficient, and
so it avoids a corner solution with q∗ = 1. Assumption A8 implies that the MSSP
will choose the security quality independent of the protection fee he charges.
The game begins with nature chooses clients’ risk level, and the MSSP
chooses capacity m and publishes contract information such as price p. After
that, a client will decide whether to consult the MSSP. If not, she will directly
choose protection quality in-house. Otherwise, she will visit the MSSP and re-
ceive a diagnosis. Based on the diagnosis result and offered price, the client will
decide whether to accept the service. The MSSP will choose protection quality
4 For example, the MSSP may exaggerate his clients’ risks and over-charge them with-
out working hard to protect them.
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if she accept, or she will just choose protection quality in-house otherwise. After
the protection quality is decided, the hacker launches attacks and outcomes are
realized.
A client who does nothing in security protection will have expected utility
u0 = (1− a¯) v, where a¯ = rah + (1− r) al is the expected attack rate. Suppose
that a client has decided to develop security protection in-house. Her expected
utility would be
uk = [1− a¯ (1− qk)] v − 1
2
ckq
2
k, (1)
where qk is the security quality from in-house development. Differentiating uk
with respect to qk, the optimal quality is q
∗
k =
a¯v
ck
. Therefore, the expected utility
of the client with in-house development is
u∗k = (1− a¯) v +
1
2
(a¯v)
2
ck
, (2)
which is greater than the expected utility of not protecting the system, i.e.
u∗k > u0. Hence, u
∗
k is the client’s reservation utility.
To attract clients to use his service, the MSSP has to introduce a compensa-
tion term (“Liability”) β ∈ (0, 1] in the contract. If a client is attacked under the
MSSP’s protection and loses v, then the MSSP has to compensate her by βv.
Without such compensation, by assumption A8, the MSSP can always minimize
his cost by providing qs = 0, which is undesirable to the clients.
2.1 One Price Solves All
We first consider the case where the MSSP charges a single price p on security
protection to all clients. A client’s expected utility of outsourcing to the MSSP
would be
us = r [1− ah (1− β) (1− qs,h)] v + (1− r) [1− al (1− β) (1− qs,l)] v − p, (3)
and the MSSP’s expected profit would be
pi = r
[
p− ah (1− qs,h)βv − 1
2
csq
2
s,h
]
+ (1− r)
[
p− al (1− qs,l)βv − 1
2
csq
2
s,l
]
.
(4)
Differentiating pi with respect to qs,h and qs,l, the optimal quality is q
∗
s,h =
ahβv
cs
and q∗s,l =
alβv
cs
. By backward induction, the client’s expected utility of
outsourcing becomes
us = (1− a¯) v + a¯βv +
(
a¯2 + σ2a
)
v2
cs
β (1− β)− p, (5)
where σ2a = r (1− r) (ah − al)2 is the variance of the attack rate. Substituting
q∗s,h and q
∗
s,l into (4), the MSSP’s profit maximization problem becomes:
max
p,β
[
p− a¯βv + 1
2
(
a¯2 + σ2a
)
(βv)
2
cs
]
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s.t. p ≤ a¯βv + v2
[
β (1− β) (a¯2 + σ2a)
cs
− 1
2
a¯2
ck
]
.
The price constraint ensures that the clients are not worse off after using the
MSSP’s service, i.e. us ≥ u∗k. The optimal solution is β∗ = 1, p∗ = a¯v − 12 (a¯v)
2
ck
,
and pi∗ = v
2
2
(
a¯2+σ2a
cs
− a¯2ck
)
> 0.
Will the MSSP price discriminate, i.e., offer ph to high risk clients and pl to
low risk clients? It turns out that he will not. If he sets the prices honestly, the
clients will learn their own risk levels from the MSSP’s diagnosis and pricing.
This will help the clients select the proper qk with respect to their risk levels,
which would increase their reservation utility and so decrease the MSSP’s profit.
On the other hand, if the MSSP “cheats” the clients on pricing, then they could
always maximize their utility by only accepting a low price, pl ≤ p∗.
From the above reasoning, we propose that the MSSP will prefer to offer a
single price contract in the information security outsourcing market:
Proposition 1. In information security outsourcing, setting a single price con-
tract with liability term, which does not reveal any risk information of the clients,
is optimal for the MSSP.
Note that the low risk clients are worse off because they will be subsidizing
the high risk clients. Therefore, the MSSP will tend to exaggerate clients’ risk
to encourage them to use his service. Once the clients recognize this fact, they
will probably ignore the MSSP’s recommendation and protect their own system
using the average quality. This results in either over-protected for low risk clients
or under-protected for high risk clients, which makes the system less usable.
We next consider the case when the clients can seek alternative diagnosis (we
call this “self-diagnosis”).
2.2 Self-Diagnosis
With self-diagnosis, we assume that the clients can pay dk to a third-party
consultant to reveal her risk. After self-diagnosis, the clients can treat themselves
using the corresponding quality, i.e. q∗k,h =
ahv
ck
and q∗k,l =
alv
ck
. The reservation
utility of a client with risk level ω after self-diagnosis and self-treatment will be
ud∗k,ω = (1− aω) v +
1
2
(aωv)
2
ck
− dk. (6)
Further, the client will choose between in-house protection and outsourcing,
depending on which option gives more utility, after self-diagnosis. Therefore, the
minimum expected utility of a client after self-diagnosis would be
ud∗k = (1− a¯) v +
1
2
(a¯v)
2
ck
+
1
2
(σav)
2
ck
− dk. (7)
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If dk ≤ 12 (σav)
2
ck
, then ud∗k ≥ u∗k, which means that it is efficient for clients to
seek self-diagnosis. We will assume that such a condition holds in the following
analysis.
We first consider the case where the MSSP charges different prices for differ-
ent types of clients. Suppose that the MSSP charges honestly, i.e., offering ph to
high risk clients and pl to low risk clients. This situation is similar to serving two
market segments with r = 1 and r = 0, which is both profitable. Therefore, he
will serve both types of clients with the following profit maximization problem:
max
ph,pl,β
r
[
ph − ahβv + 1
2
(ahβv)
2
cs
]
+ (1− r)
[
pl − alβv + 1
2
(alβv)
2
cs
]
,
s.t. us,h ≥ u∗k,h, us,l ≥ u∗k,l.
The constraints show that the MSSP charges the clients honestly so that a
client with a particular type of risk will not be worse off. The solution is β∗ = 1,
p∗h = ahv − 12 (ahv)
2
ck
> p∗l = alv − 12 (alv)
2
ck
, and pi∗ = (
a¯2+σ2a)v
2
2
(
1
cs
− 1ck
)
.
However, the MSSP has incentive to overcharge the low risk clients with p∗h,
which is the main reason that price discrimination is unsustainable in the case
without self-diagnosis. A client will always accept p∗l since it is beneficial for
either type, and self-diagnose only when p∗h is offered. By doing so, the clients
can punish a dishonest MSSP by turning down the p∗h offer and do in-house
protection instead. Therefore, the MSSP will earn nothing if he overcharges the
clients, and the clients know it.
We next consider the possibility of a mixed self-diagnosis strategy. To con-
struct such a strategy, consider the profit of serving a low risk client with low
price:
pil,p∗l =
(alv)
2
2
(
1
cs
− 1
ck
)
, (8)
and the profit of serving a low risk client with a high price:
pil,p∗h = (1− ρ)
[
(alv)
2
2
(
1
cs
− 1
ck
)
+ (ah − al) v
(
1− 1
2
ahv
ck
− 1
2
alv
ck
)]
, (9)
where ρ is the probability of self-diagnosis when a client was offered a high price
(“Re-diagnosis Rate”). An effective mixed strategy should result in pil,p∗h ≤ pil,p∗l ,
which gives rise to the re-diagnosis rate:
ρ ≥
(ah − al)
(
1− 12 ahvck − 12 alvck
)
(ah − al)
(
1− 12 ahvck − 12 alvck
)
+ a2l v
(
1
cs
− 1ck
) . (10)
The client would maximize her utility by minimizing the re-diagnosis rate, and
so the equality holds for (10) in equilibrium. This re-diagnosis rate removes the
MSSP’s incentive to cheat and supports the price discrimination equilibrium.
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We now consider the case where the MSSP charges a single price p to all
clients. If all client prefer to self-diagnose, then at least one type of clients would
benefit from using the revealed risk information for in-house treatment. So, the
MSSP can earn more by serving both types of clients with price discrimination.
On the other hand, the clients would prefer to use the MSSP’s service directly
without self-diagnosis if and only if the MSSP charges them a low price. But,
by doing so he will get sub-optimal profit because he is practically giving out
surplus to high risk clients.
From the above discussion, the MSSP could earn more profit by price dis-
crimination. Hence, the self-diagnosis option removes the MSSP’s incentive to
conceal risk information.
Proposition 2. With a cheap self-diagnosis option, the MSSP will truthfully
reveal the clients’ risk information.
When the MSSP’s diagnosis result is verifiable at a low cost, clients can actu-
ally learn from the MSSP’s recommendation. As a result, they can protect their
own system according to their own risk, so that the systems are secured without
losing usability. However, in reality, different systems are often interconnected
to address users’ need, which introduce new challenges. In the next section, we
will examine how system interdependency risks affect the current situation.
3 System Interdependency Model
We add the following assumption to extend the basic model with system inter-
dependency risks: [A9] A client who joined the MSSP’s network will lose εv if
at least one other system in the MSSP’s network is compromised. The MSSP
needs to compensate βεv to all affected clients who are not directly attacked.
Consider the MSSP’s network with m clients. The probability of at least one
system being attacked is
PX>0 = 1−
mh∏
i=1
[1− ah (1− qs,h,i)]
ml∏
i=1
[1− al (1− qs,l,i)] , (11)
where mh is the number of high risk clients in the network, ml is the number
of low risk clients in the network, mh +ml = m. The loss of a client j with risk
level ω will be Lω,jv = aω (1− qs,ω,j) (1− ε) v+ εvPX>0. Since the loss involves
m-th order terms, to simplify the analysis, we approximate it by only retaining
the first order terms:
˜Lω,j = aω (1− qs,ω,j) (1− ε) + ε
[
mh∑
i=1
ah (1− qs,h,i) +
ml∑
i=1
al (1− qs,l,i)
]
. (12)
3.1 Without Self-Diagnosis
Suppose that the MSSP charges p to all clients. The expected utility of client j
who uses the MSSP’s service would be
us,j = r [(1− Lh,j) v + Lh,jβv − p] + (1− r) [(1− Ll,j) v + Ll,jβv − p] , (13)
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and the MSSP’s expected total profit would be
pi =
mh∑
i=1
(
p− Lh,iβv − 1
2
csq
2
s,h,i
)
+
ml∑
i=1
(
p− Ll,iβv − 1
2
csq
2
s,l,i
)
. (14)
Differentiating pi with respect to qs,h,i and qs,l,i, the optimal quality is q
∗
s,h,i =
Tahβv
cs
and q∗s,l,i =
Talβv
cs
, where T = 1 + ε (m− 1) is the (amplified) risk factor
due to system interdependency.
The expected utility of outsourcing the protection would then become
us =
[
1− L¯ (1− β)] v − p, (15)
where L¯ = T a¯− T
2(a¯2+σ2a)βv
cs
is the expected loss after outsourcing. Now, suppose
that the MSSP is committed to serve a client after diagnosis, which means that
he cannot freely choose mh and ml. In a network with m clients, the expected
number of high risk clients would be E [mh] = rm, and the expected number
of low risk clients would be E [ml] = (1− r)m. Therefore, the MSSP’s profit
maximization problem becomes
max
p,β,m
m
[
p− L¯βv − 1
2
(
a¯2 + σ2a
)
(Tβv)
2
cs
]
s.t. p ≤ (a¯− L¯) v + L¯βv − 1
2
(a¯v)
2
ck
.
The solution is β∗ = 1, p∗ = a¯v − 12 (a¯v)
2
ck
, and the number of clients served by
the MSSP satisfies the following equation: m∗ = 12 +
E[aq∗s ]v− 12 csE[q∗2s ]− 12 (a¯v)
2
ck
2εv(a¯−E[aq∗s ]) ,
where E [aq∗s ] = rahq
∗
s,h + (1− r) alq∗s,l and E
[
q∗2s
]
= rq∗2s,h + (1− r) q∗2s,l.
If the MSSP can freely choose mh and ml, when he will charge p
∗, a low
risk client who uses the MSSP’s service will be subsidizing the high risk clients.
Therefore, the optimal decision for the MSSP is to serve only the low risk clients
in equilibrium, and get the subsidies as profit.
However, once the clients realize this, they will demand for a lower price
since p∗ is not a desirable price for low risk clients. Therefore, the MSSP can
no longer charge p∗ if he does not commit to serve the clients, which results in
sub-optimal profits.
What if the MSSP sets different prices for different clients? Since the inter-
dependency risk limits the MSSP’s capacity, and serving a high risk client with
p∗h is more profitable compared with serving a low risk client with p
∗
l , the MSSP
will prefer to serve only the high risk clients. Specifically, the optimal decision
for capacity satisfies m∗l = 0 and m
∗
h =
1
2 +
ahvq
∗
s,h− 12 csq∗2s,h− 12
(ahv)
2
ck
2εahv(1−q∗s,h)
. Therefore,
the MSSP has great incentive to overcharge the low risk clients, since kicking
out a low risk client is not a problem.5 Hence, the MSSP always prefers to offer
5 If a low risk client accepts ph, the MSSP can earn even more since the required
protection level and the interdependency risk brought by this client is lower.
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a high price ph, which means that posting two prices cannot be an equilibrium
strategy.
Yet, clients will only accept a low price pl, and they will suspect that they
get overcharged when ph is offered. These competing strategies cause the market
to breakdown.
If the MSSP uses a mixed strategy and offers ph and pl sometimes, clients
will only accept when pl is offered, which result in sub-optimal profit compared
with the case of using single price with service commitment.
From the above discussion, if the MSSP does not commit to serve every
clients, then he will end up serving only one type of clients. This reveal the
clients’ risk information, and hence result in sub-optimal profit, or even market
breakdown. Therefore, the MSSP will prefer to charge a single price and commit
to serve every client, which leads to a similar outcome as Proposition 1.
3.2 With Self-Diagnosis
Continue from the above discussion, when the MSSP posts two prices, he is
committed to serve any clients with ph. However, with self-diagnosis, the clients
can verify whether they really get overcharged. Hence, the clients who learn that
they have a high risk from self-diagnosis will continue to use the MSSP’s service.
The market will not breakdown and the MSSP’s aggressive pricing strategy
is actually “resurrected” by self-diagnosis. The MSSP has no incentive to deviate
from this strategy, since offering pl < ph will result in sub-optimal profit.
Therefore, even when self-diagnosis is feasible, the credence goods problem
still remains when system interdependency is present.
Proposition 3. In the presence of system interdependency, when there are suf-
ficient high risk clients in the market and the clients can cheaply self-diagnose,
then the MSSP will always charge a single price ph, and only high risk clients
will use the MSSP’s service. In other words, self-diagnosis will not dissuade the
MSSP’s from concealing the clients’ risk information.
In this situation, low risk clients are rejected by the MSSP, so that they
cannot enjoy a better protection. Even worse, every clients need to verify the
MSSP’s diagnosis, which results in duplication of diagnosis cost.
4 Final Remarks
The typical credence goods problem is often solved by introducing verifiability
of the service provider’s efforts. Here, we show that by introducing verifiability
in the MSSP’s diagnosis (which is done by self-diagnosis), the MSSP will truth-
fully reveal the clients’ risks in the basic setting. However, when we introduce
system interdependency risks into the model, the MSSP will have incentives to
exaggerate clients’ risks and offer a high price, which seems common in reality.
This brings challenges to organizations that want to learn their risk level and
avoid constantly over-paying for security protections. In future work we shall
study alternative mechanisms that can tackle this challenge.
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Appendix: Proof of Propositions
Proof of Proposition 1
We first derive the equilibrium profit under single price contract. The Lagrange
function of the profit maximization problem is
Λ = p− a¯βv+
(
a¯2 + σ2a
)
(βv)
2
2cs
−λ
{
p− a¯βv − v2
[
β (1− β) (a¯2 + σ2a)
cs
− a¯
2
2ck
]}
(16)
where λ ≥ 0. The first order conditions are:
∂Λ
∂p
= 1− λ = 0 (17)
∂Λ
∂β
=
(
a¯2 + σ2a
)
v2
cs
(β − 2βλ+ λ)− a¯v (1− λ) (18)
and the Kuhn-Tucker condition is:
−λ
{
p− a¯βv − v2
[
β (1− β) (a¯2 + σ2a)
cs
− 1
2
a¯2
ck
]}
= 0 (19)
Solving the above equations, we have λ = 1, β∗ = 1, and p∗ = a¯v − 12 (a¯v)
2
ck
.
Substitute them back to (4) and (5) yields the client’s expected utility and the
MSSP’s expected profit:
u∗s = (1− a¯) v +
1
2
(a¯v)
2
ck
= u∗k (20)
pi∗ =
v2
2
(
a¯2 + σ2a
cs
− a¯
2
ck
)
(21)
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We then prove that price discrimination is sub-optimal. Suppose the MSSP
charges two price honestly, then clients can infer their risk information and use
it to decide in-house protection quality. The reservation utility of a client with
risk level ω is
u∗∗k,ω = (1− aω) v +
1
2
(aωv)
2
ck
(22)
which can be obtained by considering a degenerated market with r = 1 and
r = 1 on (2). Hence, the overall expected reservation utility of a client will be
u∗∗k = (1− a¯) v +
1
2
(
a¯2 + σ2a
)
v2
ck
(23)
Since the overall reservation utility u∗∗k is increased, and the total welfare be-
tween a client and the MSSP does not change, the MSSP’s profit is decreased.
Specifically, it becomes:
pi∗∗ =
(
a¯2 + σ2a
)
v2
2
(
1
cs
− 1
ck
)
(24)
By comparing (21), (22), (24) and (25), part of the MSSP’s surplus 12
(σav)
2
ck
moves towards the client. Therefore, offering a single price is optimal for the
MSSP.
Proof of Proposition 2
We first discuss the way to obtain the equilibrium profit, which is basically
applying the result in Proposition 1. Consider the MSSP serves two different
market with r = 1 and r = 0, and substitute them into the equilibrium profit
from Proposition 1, i.e. (22). By taking the weighted average, we can obtain the
equilibrium profit:
pi∗ =
(
a¯2 + σ2a
)
v2
2
(
1
cs
− 1
ck
)
(25)
We then show that the MSSP will not stick on offering a single price in the
equilibrium. Firstly, it is trivial to see that if not all clients uses the MSSP’s
service, his profit will be sub-optimal and he can increase it by price discrimi-
nation. Secondly, If every clients uses the MSSP’s service, the total welfare the
MSSP and a client will be
W = r
{[
1− ah
(
1− q∗s,h
)]
v − csq
∗2
s,h
2
}
+(1− r)
{[
1− al
(
1− q∗s,l
)]
v − csq
∗2
s,l
2
}
(26)
which is obtained by applying the MSSP’s cost cs into clients’ problem. Note
that the total welfare W = us + pi in this case. From previous analysis, the
optimal quality for the MSSP will always be q∗s,h =
ahβv
cs
and q∗s,l =
alβv
cs
. Hence,
(27) could be re-written as:
W = (1− a¯) v + (a¯2 + σ2a) v2 [β (2− β)2cs
]
(27)
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A client will only use the MSSP’s service when us ≥ ud∗k . Hence, the MSSP’s
profit will be
pi ≤ (a¯2 + σ2a) v2 [β (2− β)2cs − 12ck
]
+ dk (28)
The equality holds when us = u
d∗
k , which means the MSSP extracts all surplus
from clients. And the right hand side of (29) reaches the maximum when β = 1.
However, us = u
d∗
k and β = 1 are contradicting. In order to have us = u
d∗
k , the
price p must satisfy the following:
p = ahβv − 1
2
(ahv)
2
ck
+
(ahv)
2
cs
β (1− β) (29)
p = alβv − 1
2
(alv)
2
ck
+
(alv)
2
cs
β (1− β) (30)
Since ah > al and ahv < ck, β = 1 cannot solve both (30) and (31) together.
Therefore, a sufficient small dk would guarantee that the profit of offering single
price is smaller than that of offering two different prices. Hence, the MSSP will
offer two prices honestly and it solves the credence good problem.
